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utility as well.4 Also, most nonutilitarian moral schemes accord fr autonomous persons the right to make enforceable contracts.5 If th eral enforceability of contracts is assumed, two types of reasons justify regulating contracts to give security. First are reasons that from the failure of the presuppositions on which the "enforceabil sumption" rests. When consumers are incompetent or uninforme markets behave noncompetitively, regulation of consumer transa often is justifiable.6 Reasons to regulate occasioned by the inapplic of the enforceability assumption are here called "contract law rea As an example of their application in this context, a court could u unconscionability doctrine to strike down a broad security interest that is written in fine print and arcane legal language.7 When no co law reasons support nonenforcement, other reasons of fairness or could require regulation in particular cases. A second set of reasons ably justifying the regulation described above thus may derive fro peculiar nature of security interests in consumer goods. Consumer be unjustifiably disadvantaged by the giving of security in ways t not disadvantage business debtors. A set of reasons of this second in large part responsible for the regulation just described and is the su of this paper.8 The reasons in this second set are as follows:
4 See Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability L.R. 1053 (1977) . The caveat respecting social utility follows from the possibility that ers to a contract may prefer that it not be made or made in a different form. In circumstance, enforcing the contract as made reduces the utility of the outsiders; dep on the relevant magnitudes, enforcement could actually diminish social utility. This p ity does seem remote. Also, in consumer contexts the outsiders desiring nonenforcem likely to occupy social statuses higher than those of the consumer parties. When t nonenforcement increases the utility of the relatively well off at the expense of the r worse off, which redistributes wealth in the wrong direction. See id. at 1061-63.
5 See P.S. Atiyah, Promises, Morals and Law (1981) ; Charles Fried, Contract as Pr A Theory of Contractual Obligation (1981) .
6 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 Harv. L. R (1982); Schwartz, supra note 4.
7 See Williams v. 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. App. 196 paper uses the term "contract law reasons" to capture the notion that some legal p are best analyzed from an ex ante or contract law perspective, where the primary con whether a set of outcomes-for example, contracts-was generated by a normativel factory process, rather than analyzed from an ex post perspective, where the p concern is whether a set of outcomes is itself satisfactory, decided largely independen the process that generated it. In a more concrete sense, "contract law reasons" ar that would be grounds for refusing to enforce according to such standard contra doctrines as unconscionability. The reasons about to be considered as justifications regulation described above fit uneasily, if at all, into standard contract doctrines, wh explain why consumer goods security problems seldom are analyzed in contract law Ultimately, of course, there are only good or bad reasons for regulation.
8 A third possible set of reasons that could justify restricting security has to do wi nature of security generally. Secured debt may sometimes have undesirable distrib 1. Secured creditors are said systema obtained on resale of the collateral because these creditors can sue for deficiency judgments. For example, if the unpaid debt on default is $1,500 and the collateral has a fair market value of $1,000, a secured creditor, it is claimed, will sell the collateral for less than $1,000 and sue for a deficiency in excess of $500. The Uniform Commercial Code prohibits this practice and gives debtors a cause of action should it occur.9 The UCC's sanctions, however, are said to be inadequate; alternatively, consumers allegedly lack the resources or sophistication to use the Code's protection. In either case, further regulation, such as banning deficiency judgments, is thought necessary.
2. Repossession "destroys value" because individual debtors commonly value goods in excess of their market prices but repossessing creditors at best resell at these prices. Because repossession imposes greater harms on debtors than it creates gains for creditors, it actually minimizes welfare.
3. Creditors seldom repossess in order to reduce the size of the unpaid debt with the proceeds of the collateral because these proceeds often are trivial. Instead, creditors take security to enable them to coerce payment by threats to repossess. This coercion sometimes causes consumers to pay debts that are neither legally nor morally owing. Such "in terrorem repossessions" use people as means rather than respect them as ends and as such are wrongful.10 4. Enforcing broad security interests may violate some inalienable right of debtors to retain the property at issue. An untrammeled power to repossess could enable creditors to deprive persons of goods that may be necessary to their leading full and autonomous lives. Because people have a right to lead such lives, unrestricted security can violate their rights.
This property rights theme is more hinted at than developed in the discussions concerning regulation, but it seems an important influence. It apparently explains such statements as that full enforcement of security interests in consumer durables "would cause too great a personal hardship." " consequences or be a less efficient form of credit than unsecured debt. This third set of reasons now seems not well enough understood to justify regulation. See Alan Schwartz,This paper argues that these four reasons cannot justify rest curity interests in consumer goods. One way to sustain this arg suppose consumers to be perfectly informed of the post-defau that creditors may pursue. As an example, if consumers knew creditors would not maximize the value of repossessed collat consumers could conveniently monitor creditor promises to creditors would have an incentive to make and comply with ises. The market would create incentives for creditors to com this dimension of transaction fairness as well as along the mo dimensions of price and quality. Consumers, however, often s fectly informed respecting creditor strategies, and regulators suppose consumers to know little. It thus is useful to ask whether reasons just set forth can justify regulating security interests post-default strategy of which consumers are aware is that se itors will repossess on default. This paper concludes that the tions are unpersuasive even given such limited knowledge. H law applicable to security interests in consumer goods should only from contract law doctrines.12
The practical importance of this conclusion is that contract suggest different forms of regulation from those now used. F unconscionability decisions traditionally are made case by cas than in the form of statutory prohibitions. Alternatively, a might choose to regulate security in the way warranties are o lated now; that is, it may permit enforcement only of those secur est clauses that are set forth in "clear and conspicuous" l Broad statutory prohibitions, however, such as those banning judgments, could be justified only by the second set of reason good faith. However, while a violation of the duty of good faith would be g defense to an action for a deficiency, standard contract theory does not pr possibility of violations of the duty can support a prophylactic ban on an e transactions. The second justification apparently has no contract analogue. N third, because the creditor's exercising a contract right in order to collect legally owing apparently does not constitute economic duress. The fourth ju falls without contract law because contract law is not concerned with the a property rights but rather with the trades that rights holders are free to mak 12 This paper assumes rather than determines that consumers are adequat respecting the prices and terms that constitute credit contracts. See text at not For a discussion of how the state should make such determinations and re existence of inadequate information, see Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Int Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analy L. Rev. 630 (1979) ; Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Competitive Equilibria in M Heterogeneous Goods under Imperfect Information: A Theoretical Analysi Implications, 12 Bell J. Econ. 181 (1982) .
13 See Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. ?? 2301-12 (1976 Part I briefly describes the principal legal limitations on the taking of security. Part II shows that creditors have incentives to maximize the proceeds from resale and that the scanty available evidence suggests that they do so. Part III argues that no value is lost through repossession or that value is merely transferred; if either outcome occurs, the "value destruction" case against security falls. Part IV next argues that in terrorem repossessions are less common than is generally supposed and that they are not objectionable when their effect is understood. Finally, Part V argues that the moral theories underlying the objection that security violates persons' property rights may accord people rights to things but cannot sustain present limitations on the power of people to mortgage those things. In consequence of these arguments, this paper concludes that contracts to give security interests in consumer goods pose only the problem that consumer contracts generally pose, which is that the consent of consumers to them sometimes may not be fully free.14 I. THE LAW Section 9-507(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides th aspect of the disposition [of collateral by the secured creditor] the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commerc sonable." Resale "may be by public [i.e., auction] or private ings"; in either case, "reasonable notification" of the sale must the debtor. The secured party is liable to the debtor for "any l by a failure to comply with Article 9. Also, if the collateral is goods, the Code imposes a penalty on a creditor who fails to r commercially reasonable manner, independently of whether t sumer debtor suffered loss: the noncomplying creditor is liabl credit service charge plus ten percent of the principal amount o ... plus ten percent of the cash price."15 These Article 9 rules respond only to one of the grounds th justify regulation of security interests in consumer goods, tha systematically fail to maximize the collateral's value. The rules, 14 Much of the argument made below also applies to state statutes that permit execute on property after a judgment of default is rendered. Indeed, execution thought of as state-supplied security terms. This paper focuses on consen interests because much regulatory attention has been devoted to them; readers ca obvious connections to execution laws. Those laws, however, regulate repo differently than does the Code and thus deserve independent study. 15 UCC ? 9-507(1). All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms may be thought not to create sufficient incentives for credit imize. This is partly because ? 9-507(2) provides that a sale ca found unreasonable just because "a better price could have bee by a sale at a different time or in a different method"; rathe obtained is only one of the factors relevant to ascertaining r ness. This latitude could make it difficult for a debtor to pro creditor actually made a nonmaximizing resale. In addition, m sumers may lack the resources and sophistication to police co with Article 9.
Largely in consequence of these felt difficulties, courts have insisted on strict compliance with Article 9 procedures, in particular the notice-ofresale requirement, and have created their own sanctions to deter creditor misbehavior. The principal sanctions are: (a) in some states, to deny a deficiency judgment to a creditor who fails to comply with the Code,16 and (b) in other states, to impose on the noncomplying creditor the burden of proving that the collateral actually was worth less than the unpaid debt.17
A creditor who cannot show that the collateral was worth less than the unpaid debt has no grounds on which to claim a deficiency. In addition courts have begun to require creditors to explain large differences between repossession sale prices and the collateral's apparent value, even when a debtor fails to prove the creditor's noncompliance with the statute. A creditor who cannot give a satisfactory explanation is precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment.18
These judicial additions to Article 9 respond only partially to the concerns that underlie the "failure to maximize" justification for limiting th ability of consumers to grant security. For example, suppose that automobile dealers in a given locality agree to sell repossessed cars to one another at less, but not excessively less, than fair market value; however when each dealer repossesses he gives his debtor the requisite Article 9 notice and otherwise apparently complies with the statute. Few consume debtors have the resources to prove that such a cartel exists, yet withou such proof the judicial sanctions just set out could not be imposed. Also, Article 9, even as supplemented by the courts, is not at all responsive to the concerns that commercially reasonable resales can destroy value, be used for in terrorem purposes, or violate persons' property rights. Addi tional regulation of security interests in consumer goods thus seems nec essary and exists. fair market retail value is the most the collateral could yie creditors to reduce the outstanding debt by this value creates for creditors actually to obtain it. The ban on deficiency jud discourages the taking of security when the collateral is wo relation to the debt. It is in this case that the latter three seem most compelling, as I will show below.27
Article 9 of the UCC apparently responds intelligently to th cases of creditors' venality or sloth that will inevitably arise additions to it and the recent statutory and administrative r described presuppose the validity of one or more of the four for regulation listed above. It is to these justifications that at be paid.
II. CREDITORS Do NOT FAIL TO MAXIMIZE
Many items are repossessed and resold each year. Because persons sometimes are careless or lazy, some of these items would be sold at less than their best price even if creditors sought to maximize resale proceeds. This fact cannot support the legal reforms just described because any system is subject to occasional human errors. Supporters of these reforms thus must make the stronger claim either that factors systematically prevent secured creditors from maximizing resale proceeds or that secured creditors have incentives not to maximize. No systematic factors have been identified that could prevent creditors from maximizing. Perhaps because of this, reformers claim that creditors have no incentive to maximize and that the evidence indicates that nonmaximizing resales are common.
Part II shows that it would be irrational of secured maximize profits to fail to maximize resale proce creditor does not act in concert with other creditors. A failure to maximize is a profitable strategy for creditors only if creditors form cartels. Part II goes on to argue that creditor cartels to depress the resale prices of 27 These justifications also support related regulation. As an example, ?? 5.110 and 5.111 of the UCCC accord consumers a right to cure defaults: if a consumer is in default for ten days for failure to make a payment, the creditor is required to send a notice of default; the consumer then has twenty days to cure the default. The creditor cannot foreclose during the requisite thirty-day period. Comment 3 to ? 5.110 explains that the right to cure is meant to prevent excessively prompt repossessions. This seemingly suggests that creditors do better by repossessing, selling the goods for less than their market value and suing for a deficiency. The first and most well known claim for this view is Philip Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 20 (1969) . The right to cure also is justified, in the comment, as preserving the consumer's ability to present defenses before foreclosure, which is a major theme underlying the distaste for in terrorem repossessions. See text at notes 59-60, infra. The Federal Trade Commission Staff Report on the Proposed Trad Regulation Rule described above concisely summarized the claim th creditors systematically fail to maximize:
The creditor does not necessarily have an incentive to obtain the highest po price for the collateral. There are a number of reasons for this, including [ fact that Article 9 of the UCC which requires that any surplus be repaid t consumer imposes a ceiling on the return available to a creditor in a reposs sale.
[2] At the same time, the fact that a deficiencies [sic] can be collected consumers in many cases tends to mitigate any necessity of maximizing th posession sales price.
[3] Moreover, any loss to a creditor in the form of uncollected deficiency is mitigated by immediate tax benefits which tend to r the amount of the actual loss by 50 percent.28
The report explained, in connection with the second reason given: "I area of high priced collateral, creditors will invest in a repossession effort only to a point where the net return from the repossession equals the net return from resources invested in the collection of deficiencies. Thus, where the right to collect deficiencies exists, a lesser sales effort is a reasonable expectation."29 Respecting the first of these reasons, creditors do lack an incentive to maximize the surplus-the excess of the collateral's resale price over the unpaid debt-because the surplus accrues to debtors. The perceived problem that prompted the legal reforms described above, however, was not that resales generated insufficient surpluses; a surplus is rare when consumer goods are resold. Decision makers were instead concerned with the possibility that nonmaximizing resales increased the deficiencies that consumers had to pay. Moreover, if creditors maximize the proceeds received from resold collat- eral when its value equals or is less than the outstanding debt, of insufficient surpluses should vanish. This is because cred monly set up systems whereby repossessed collateral is sold systems are designed to maximize resale proceeds, because t commonly is worth less than the unpaid debt, the occasional also be maximized, for creditors have no reason to identify r to generate surpluses and then vary the standard routine on purpose of reducing them. Thus, if standard practice is to m surpluses also should be maximized. When the collateral will bring less than the unpaid debt, sta tice allegedly is not to maximize because of the availability of judgments, the second reason the FTC staff gave, but this re If secured creditors maximize profits and do not act in concer creditors, each creditor must do worse by not maximizing r than by maximizing it.
To see why, suppose first that (1) creditors bear their own costs; (2) these costs vary directly with the sums at issue; (3) their creditors' resale costs; (4) debtors always can pay judgm against them; (5) creditors value dollars obtained throug equally with dollars obtained through resale, even though "lit lars" are obtained some time after resale dollars. In these circ a creditor has an incentive to sell the collateral for as much and to sue for as little as possible. This is because resale costs him, while litigation costs are not free and rise with the amount he sues. Respecting the first three of these assumptions, ? UCC authorizes creditors to charge debtors with resale costs United States parties commonly bear their own litigation co costs probably do rise with the amounts at issue since large likely to be more seriously contested than small ones and cour likely to demand convincing proof of the validity of large cl creditors have an incentive to maximize resale revenues, whic be done by reselling the collateral at the market price.
It may be objected that creditors often shift their litigati defaulting debtors by contract. This objection must fall becau clusion that creditors have an incentive to maximize resale p tains even if assumption 1 is false, when assumptions 4 and false. To see that these assumptions are both false and germane, one should realize that secured creditors actually attempt to recover unpaid debts in two stages. At the first stage the creditor repossesses and resells the collateral; at the second stage he sues for a deficiency. The first stage recovery is certain, in the sense that the creditor always can resell at the market price, and is relatively prompt because the creditor can resell soon This conclusion also obtains independent of the costs of recovering a debt by resale as contrasted with the costs of recovering a debt by legal action. Although the creditor has a right to recover resale costs in the deficiency suit, it would be unlawful and unwise of the creditor to resell when resale costs exceed resale proceeds.30 When resale costs are less than resale proceeds, the creditor's incentive is to maximize the difference between these values, for it actually is this sum that is obtainable without risk or delay. The difference between resale gains and costs is maximized at the highest price the collateral can command, its value in the market. Perhaps a more concise way of putting this is that every dollar the creditor nets by resale reduces the outstanding debt by a dollar; every dollar the creditor defers to the deficiency action to collect will reduce the outstanding debt by less than a dollar because the expected value of litigation dollar is less than one, these dollars being subject to risk and delay. Thus the creditor's incentive is to maximize the net gain from resale.
An example may illuminate this analysis. Suppose that a bank takes a security interest in a new car, the debtor makes several payments and defaults, and the bank repossesses. Then, (i) the unpaid debt (D) is $5,000; (ii) the value a maximizing resale (M) would bring is $3,000; (iii) the value of a nonmaximizing resale (N) is $1,500; (iv) the probability (p), 30 UCC ? 9-504(3) requires resales to be conducted in a "commercially reasonable" manner. This section would bar a creditor from suing for the excess of resale costs over gains. This is because the creditor would resell when the costs exceed the gains only to impose a penalty on the debtor in the amount of the difference, and penalties have been held to be inappropriate sanctions for contract breaches; hence it is "unreasonable" of creditors to exact them. Creditors are said sometimes to repossess when resale costs exceed resale gains in order to establish a credible threat that will induce other debtors to pay, see text at notes 59-60, infra; they would not resell in this event, however, because they could not recover the resultant loss. Hence, the expected value of maximizing resale proceeds and then suing for a deficiency is $4,071.58. Using the same formula but substituting N for M and B for A, the expected value of not maximizing and then suing is 31 The $0.12 figure is a rough approximation. A well-known early study reported that creditors recover approximately $0.08 on the dollar in insolvency proceedings. See Vern Countryman and Andrew Kaufman, Commercial Law* 170 (1971) . More recent studies show that in 1977 creditors received no money at all in 81 percent of bankruptcy cases. In cases in which assets were distributed, general creditors received 27 percent of the $229 million available for distribution-$61 million-but more than $1.1 billion of claims were discharged. A creditor suing for a deficiency is a general creditor and is unlikely to do as well as $0.12 on the dollar if the debtor does go bankrupt. See V. Countryman, A. Kaufman, & Z. Wiseman, Commercial Law Cases and Materials 250 (1982) . On the other hand, some deficiencies may be collected without bankruptcies. Recovery percentages reported by major creditors to the FTC ranged from 6 to 25 percent of deficiencies outstanding, but the figures were ambiguous in some cases. See Martin White, Consumer Repossessions and Deficiencies: New Perspectives from New Data, 62 B. U. L. Rev. 385 (1982) . The text's conclusions, as the App. below shows, are not sensitive to the precise portion of the debt that creditors can recover in deficiency actions.
assumed not to vary with the collectio instead that c = 16c', where c = $0.80 per c' = $0.05 per dollar collected by suit for values set out above, the expected value o and then suing is $3,959.24, while the ex maximizing resale and then suing is $3,8 also supposed the creditor to bear his own bear these costs and again let c = 16c'. maximizing resale ($4,131.02 ) is $56.67 gre a nonmaximizing resale ($4,074.35) . A pro all of these examples; it shows that maxim the dominant creditor strategy.32 The examples also illustrate the error of gave to explain why creditors would not m cern over an unpaid deficiency judgment deduct bad debt losses. In the principa after-tax loss to the creditor who maxim posing a marginal corporate tax rate of 44 debt of $5,000 less $4,071.58, the expecte expected tax deduction of $928.42, whi corporate tax rate imposes on the credito deduction.) The expected after-tax loss maximize is higher-$799.87, a difference surprising because the effect of the tax is to keep $0.56 of every dollar it earns and to dollar it deducts, supposing it to have in gain by forgoing income, which loses i increase deductions, for these gain it onl therefore will regard the availability of ta decision whether to maximize or not.33 32 See App., infra.
B. Wholesale Sales
Financial creditors such as banks and sales finance companies frequently sell repossessed collateral in wholesale rather than retail markets. Because retail sales generate higher returns, the practice of wholesaling repossessions is thought to disadvantage consumers. Moreover, the practice of some creditors to make wholesale sales when retail markets are available is considered to support the claim that creditors systematically fail to maximize resale proceeds.34 In consequence of these views, proposals have been made to require or encourage retail sales in all cases. An example of such a proposal is the FTC's suggested rule that would permi wholesale sales but require financers to credit consumers with the amoun that actual good faith retail sales would bring.35 The Commission staff apparently thought their rule would work in the following way: Let a bank repossess a car on which $8,000 is owed and sell the car to a dealer for $4,000. The dealer retails the car for $6,000. Under the proposed rule, th bank must credit the debtor with the amount that the retail sale brought $6,000-and thus could sue only for a $2,000 deficiency. Since the bank would then incur a $2,000 loss, banks are likely to sell at retail if the rule is passed. Whether they do or not, consumers will benefit because they wil be liable for lower deficiencies.
The examples in Section IIA above showed that creditors always do better by maximizing resale proceeds. Consumers do better as well, because a maximizing resale reduces the deficiency that the debtor owes. In the example just used, however, a bank chose to resell at wholesale, recovering $4,000, rather than to obtain $6,000 by selling at retail. This example does not refute the analysis above when resale costs are considered. Section IIB next shows, through a more careful analysis of this example, that a profit-maximizing financer probably would want to wholesale his repossessions.
It is best to begin by focusing on the difference between the wholesale Rev. 1081 Rev. (1975 .
35 See text at note 26, supra. White, supra note 31, proposes that the retail price should be presumptive evidence of the maximizing price; creditors could rebut the presumption "by establishing suitable facts concerning the condition of the repossessed vehicle or unique market circumstances." Id. at 414 (footnote omitted). Two states have adopted limited versions of the rule requiring firms to credit consumers with the retail price. Florida Statutes Annotated ? 516.31(3) (applies only to licensed small loan companies); Connecticut Gen.
Stat. ? 42-98(g) (retail value is an important element in determining the "fair market value" that firms must credit against deficiencies). and retail prices-the $2,000 premium in t mium has two elements: the cost of putti resale and a payment to the retail dealer, the service of running a retail business. duct his business unless he is able to buy $4,000 deficiency judgment that current actually supports the retail facility.
If the bank, in this illustration, had in debtors would be liable for a deficiency $4,000. This is because the bank would ne the bank had the same retail costs as the would then be able to sue for a $4,000 d culated as follows: deficiency = unpaid resale ($6,000) + costs of resale ($2,000) = $2,000 in resale costs would be to require free.36 Thus, if banks and dealers could banks and consumers would be indifferent to whether banks wholesaled or retailed; either method would generate the same deficiency.
Dealers, however, commonly can retail repossessed cars at less cost than banks or finance companies because financers have expertise in the lending business but not in the used goods business, while dealers commonly have the reverse competencies.37 When the financer's cost disadvantage is considered, the error of encouraging financers to become retailers becomes apparent. Suppose that it would cost the bank in the illustration above $2,200 to retail the car rather than the $2,000 it costs the dealer. A retail sale then would net the financer $3,800-$6,000 in proceeds 36 The FTC, proceeding by adjudication, recently held that an automobile dealer committed an unfair trade practice by charging indirect expenses such as overhead and lost profits to consumers who had defaulted and whose cars were repossessed. It was industry practice to make such charges. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed without reaching the merits, holding that the rule developed by the FTC "will have general application" because "credit practices similar to those of the dealer are widespread in the car dealership industry," and therefore the FTC had to proceed by rulemaking; it could not create such a widespread rule through adjudication. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1981) . The justification for allowing retailing banks or dealers to recover profit and overhead is identical to the justification for allowing sellers to recover these items under ? 2-708(2) of the UCC. Creditors invest resources in creating facilities to retail used goods; if they cannot recover the resultant capital costs and fixed costs (profit and overhead), they will not be put in the position they would have been had debtors performed.
37 Many creditors testified before the FTC that they made wholesale sales because they preferred to lend money rather than sell cars. See Credit Practices, supra note 28, at 289-90. The FTC staff said of this policy that it "reflects the fact that higher returns are available to the creditor when resources are devoted to activities other than U.C.C. sales," but the staff believed that this application of the principle of comparative advantage injured consumers. All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms less $2,200 in costs. A wholesale, however, nets $4,000. Thus when financers are less efficient retailers than dealers, which often seems the case, a wholesale sale actually maximizes net resale proceeds. Because this is so, the common practice of financers to make wholesale sales cannot count as evidence in support of the claim that creditors systematically fail to maximize the value of repossessed collateral. In addition, efforts such as those of the FTC's staff to encourage financers to retail repossessions would disadvantage debtors by increasing the deficiencies for which debtors would be liable. In the illustration above, the deficiency would increase from $4,000 to $4,200 were the FTC rule to apply. To summarize the argument to this point, secured creditors who wish to maximize profits and who do not act in concert with other creditors always will do better by maximizing the proceeds from resale of the collateral. The common practice of financing creditors to wholesale repossessions does not contradict this conclusion. The failure to maximize justification for law reform therefore must fall unless cartels exist.
C. Cartels
Cartels of two kinds might exist respecting the resale of re goods. First, a group of dealers could agree to bid collusively o sessed items offered for sale such that each dealer is assured a low-priced goods which can then be resold at retail prices. In th stance, the creditor that actually repossessed could be attemptin imize the resale value of the collateral but be prevented from do the dealer cartel. "Collusive bidding cartels" might exist in con with public resales, when repossessed items are sold at auction. group of dealers who carry their own paper or who use recourse financing38 might agree to resell collateral to each other for less than the collateral's value. For example, suppose dealer A repossessed a car worth $3,000 when the unpaid debt was $5,000, sold the car to dealer B for $1,500, and sued for a $3,500 deficiency. Section IIA showed that this was a losing strategy. But suppose dealer A knew that dealer B would resell him a repossessed car for $1,500 less than its actual value shortly thereafter. Then dealer A's expected loss from failing to maximize-$428.49 in the principal example above-is swamped by his expected gain-the large difference between the retail price of the car later to be purchased from dealer B and the low wholesale price that dealer B will exact. Be-38 In a recourse financing arrangement, the dealer extends purchase money credit to the consumer and sells the consumer's obligation to a financer, but the dealer is responsible for collecting the debt if the consumer defaults. Thus the dealer commonly repossesses and resells the collateral. The gain to participants in both of these cartels comes from being able to buy repossessed goods at artificially depressed wholesale prices and to resell them for full retail value. Because banks and sales finance companies sell repossessed goods but never buy them, these financers hav no incentive to join either cartel. Indeed, the financers would oppo collusive bidding cartels because these cartels reduce the returns from repossession sales. And dealer trading cartels would seldom be marketwide because financers can compete with dealers to finance sales. T question is whether either form of cartel could function in these circum stances.
This is an empirical question that cannot be finally answered o available data. No persuasive evidence of the existence of either cartel has been adduced, nor has any been successfully prosecuted facts are not conclusive. Successful cartels seldom are revealed b demic inquiry. Also, academic inquiries must use publicly availab such as profits and price movements. Outsiders cannot easily obtai figures for the small, often privately held firms that will constit cartel; and actual transaction prices of used goods are difficult to 39 Section 9-504(3) of the UCC requires a creditor to give the debtor notice of a sion sale, and ? 9-506 gives the debtor a right to redeem the collateral by paying th full plus the creditor's expenses. If a creditor proposes to sell the collateral for than its value, the debtor, in theory, could refinance on the strength of its actual v redeem. Thus both versions of the cartel explanation must presuppose the ineff debtor redemption rights. Defaulting debtors seldom do redeem, which is consist this presupposition; but they also may fail to redeem because the collateral is ro resold at the market price. A third way in which creditors could do better by not m would be for them to buy at their own repossession sales. Suppose that a creditor ses a car worth $3,000 when the debt was $5,000, "sells" the car to himself for $ sues for a $3,500 deficiency; the creditor then resells the car for $3,000. This credit do better than if he initially had sold the car for $3,000 because, while in both recovers the car's actual value, in the latter case he could claim only a $2,000 de Creditors sometimes do buy at their own repossession sales, but the evidence fail that they claim deficiencies greater than those claimed by creditors who do not. Per is because courts will scrutinize more carefully sales to oneself and because a deb so easily show bad faith in these cases; a comparison of the sale to oneself with t others would generally suffice. In this connection, ? 9-507 of the UCC, which statutory penalty for noncompliance with Article 9, seems less toothless than is supposed. As an example, in one case the amount financed on a car was $5,938.67 finance charge was $1,363.51. On default, the creditor resold the car without gi debtor the statutory notice and sued for a deficiency of $1,392.61. The debtor, repr himself, successfully claimed that the failure to give notice invoked the 9-507 pen this penalty amounted to $1,957.37; and that the deficiency claim thus was wiped These problems would make hard evidence of the existence unusual even if the cartels themselves were common. In addit in connection with the resale of used consumer goods will all-in local markets, and state antitrust enforcement is seldo Thus little can be inferred from the absence of prosecutions With the record in this state, the best that can be done is to the industry or firm traits that seemingly correlate with collus exist when repossessed collateral is resold. If these traits exist in insufficient degree, as is argued below, the burden should shift to proponents of the failure to maximize justification for law reform to prove that creditor cartels are in fact present. This is because, as shown above, without cartels such as those described here this justification must fall. The discussion focuses mainly on used car markets because creditor misbehavior is said to be most prevalent there.40 1. Collusive Bidding Cartels. The likelihood that firms will cartelize an industry varies inversely with the costs to the firms of making and policing collusive arrangements and varies directly with the ability of firms to retain significant gains from cartel behavior. Several more specific factors that seem to correlate positively with the existence of cartels have been derived from these general observations. Firms will incur relatively lower costs in forming and policing cartels when few firms exist because it is easier to make lasting arrangements among few than among many. Also, cartel costs are lower when firms deal in homogeneous goods because then the only variable on which agreement must be secured is the price. Respecting the ability of firms to retain gains from cartel behavior, cartel members have an incentive to steal customers from one another by offering buyers prices below the high cartel price but above the competitive price; if many members act in this way, the cartel will dissolve because firms that adhere to cartel arrangements would have no customers. The opportunities for cheating are lower when all sales are made publicly, so that the terms are observable; when firms have large market shares, so that the expansion of firm output that cheating produces is noticeable; and again when product and sales terms are homogeneous, so that firms cannot grant difficult-to-detect nonpecuniary price reductions such as more extensive warranties. Finally, the ability of firms to retain gains from cartel behavior is higher when entry into the industry is difficult. Were entry easy, outside firms would have a strong incentive to come in and steal cartel customers by undercutting the cartel's price. The 40 See, for example, "Consumer Credit in the United States," supra note 3, at 31. 199-227 (1980) . See also John M. Kuhlman, Nature and Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 2 Antitrust Law and Econ. Rev. 69 Spring (1969). The analysis above ignores two factors commonly discussed in connection with cartels, the effect on the likelihood of cartel behavior of the ability of firms to innovate and of declines in demand for the industry's product. See Scherer, supra; Kuhlman, supra; John Palmer, Some Economic Conditions Conducive to Collusion, 6 J. Econ. Stud. 29 (1972) . These factors are ignored here because potential cartel members are retail dealers and thus have a limited ability to innovate, and because the proponents of the failure-to-maximize justification apparently assert its applicability under all market conditions. The factors the text does discuss must be regarded as tentatively valid because they are based primarily on studies of cartels that have been prosecuted. Whether these factors characterize all firms or only those in the "prosecution prone" category is unknown, but the factors are the best we have. See Peter Asch & Joseph Seneca, Characteristics of Collusive Firms, 23 J. Indus. Econ. 223 (1975 All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms will enter to bid up prices whenever a cartel has depressed th more than the difference between actual wholesale value an costs. Creditors such as banks have an incentive to notify out such opportunities. If a collusive bidding cartel overcame these difficulties, it w face the problem of a vanishing supply of cars. This is becau seriously disadvantaged by cartels probably would refuse to chase money loans to consumers. Instead, they would buy consumer paper from dealers pursuant to recourse arrangements. In such arrangements, the dealer must repay the financer if the debtor defaults and then must dispose of the collateral. If many financers shift to recourse financing rather than repossess and resell the collateral themselves, the cartel's supply of cars will vanish. To be sure, recourse financing is more costly to financers than direct consumer loans when these loans are routinely made but probably would be less costly than remaining supine before an effective collusive bidding cartel.
To summarize, analysis suggests that collusive bidding cartels are unlikely to depress the prices at which repossessed collateral is sold. As indicated above, little direct evidence of such cartels exists.43 Respecting indirect evidence, casual surveys of automobile repossessions show that financing creditors recover approximately 80 percent of the "wholesale value" of the cars they sell.44 This wholesale value represents a prediction by knowledgeable observers of the selling prices of used cars in salable condition at the beginning of each car's model year. At least part of the apparent 20 percent discount off wholesale value is accounted for by three 43 The FTC staff asserted that collusive practices were common but that their "clandestine nature" made it "impossible to quantify their prevalence." A California bank did testify to the Commission that it faced "unduly depressed bidding" when making "remote dispositions" of collateral. It avoided the problem by creating a "centralized 'Collateral Control Center.' " See "Credit Practices," supra note 28, at 292. Apparently, no other financial creditor testified respecting collusive bidding. In very small towns, few enough dealers may exist to make plausible their attempting to form a cartel, but as the testifying bank's experience shows, the regional nature of used car markets makes the success of such cartels factors: the expense of putting reposses the fact that used cars are offered for s riskiness of purchasing from financers, to diagnose and remedy defects. Any una book and actual wholesale prices seems t inference that collusive bidding cartels e 2. Dealer Trading Cartels. In dealer trading cartels, a relatively small group of dealers resell repossessed cars to each other at less than wholesale prices. These cartels need fewer members than collusive bidding cartels, but they too face the difficulties of product heterogeneity and ease of entry. Respecting entry, if cartelization generated excess profits in particular markets, new firms probably would enter because entry costs are low. In addition, dealers compete with financers in offering credit to consumers. If dealers routinely began to claim greater deficiencies than financers on otherwise similar loans, because of dealer trading cartels, dealer credit would become more expensive than financer credit. Consumers would then have an incentive to shift away from dealer credit; their ability to do this conveniently also reduces the expected gain to cartel behavior.
Perhaps the most significant obstacle to the formation of dealer trading cartels lies in the opportunity members would have to cheat and in the difficulty of detecting and preventing cheating. Firms would be tempted to lie about their bad debt experiences when participating in the creation of periodic allocations of purchases they make from and sales they make to the cartel. This is because each cartel member has an incentive to purchase goods from the cartel at very low wholesale prices but to retail these goods at market value. Members would justify making many lowprice purchases by claiming that their debtors are quite likely to become insolvent; in such cases the expected loss from making low-price salesfrom not maximizing-is high,46 so the ability to make low-price purchases is essential to profitability. Cartel members also have an incentive to sell goods to the cartel at high prices because, respecting each individual default, the higher the price obtained on resale the lower is the expected loss. Members would justify making high-price sales by claiming 45 General Motors Acceptance Corp. reported to the FTC that its repossessed cars were in "good," "fair," "poor," or "wrecked" condition. GMAC claimed to recover 94.4 percent of wholesale value on good cars and 80.8 percent of wholesale for fair cars. ("Credit Practices," supra note 28, at 300.) A recent study using FTC data reached approximately the same results. See Philip Schuchman, Condition and Value of Repossessed Automobiles, 21 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 15 (1979) . that other members' debtors probably can satisfy deficiency full. When this is the case, a dealer would lose relatively littl ing low-price sales and thus would not need to make ma purchases.
The probability that a given firm's debtor will enter in difficult for outsiders to assess and is excessively costly for establish convincingly to outsiders. This probability must b largely from the particular circumstances of the individual debt defaulted rather than, as in the original credit extension, from tics the debtor has in common with many other consumers.
way, the judgment of whether a person is creditworthy is more made on objective factors, while the judgment of whether a has missed payments is likely to drown or recover is more made on individual, subjective factors. In consequence, chea form of members attempting to make too many low-price pu and too few low-price sales to the cartel is likely to be com difficult to stop. Also, each cartel member has an incentive t cars but to continue making low-price wholesale purchases f tel; a creditor who maximizes resale value on his own reposse able to purchase goods at artificially depressed wholesale pr better than "honest" cartel members, who necessarily must low-price wholesale sales as well as low-price purchases. Bec sales can be made privately and because a dealer probably ca explain a failure to make numerous sales to the cartel,47 at least cheating in the form of retailing cars is also likely to occur, dealers who are facing hard times that they consider temp strong incentives to cheat that dealer cartel members have an ent ease with which cheating can be done suggest that de cartels would be quite unstable.
Dealer trading cartels, analysis suggests, thus seem not m likely to influence the prices at which repossessed collateral are collusive bidding cartels. No direct evidence of the existe ing trading cartels has been offered, nor is there indirect particular, dealers seemingly do not claim larger deficiencies ers on similar credit extensions, as they would if dealer tra were common.48 If a decision maker nevertheless believed th 47 When the creditor plans to make a private sale, he must notify only t UCC ? 9-504(3).
48 One study reported that deficiencies were no larger than usual when financers resold to dealers pursuant to recourse arrangements and the dealers then sued the debtors. See Comment, Defaulting Debtors and the Judicial Process, supra note 34. Another study showed that deficiencies were lower in this circumstance. See Schuchman, supra note 27, at The belief that creditors systematically fail to maximize the value of repossessed collateral has been influential in causing decision makers to adopt or propose restrictions on the taking of security interests in consumer goods. Section 1IA has shown that creditors acting alone have incentives only to maximize resale value. Section IIB then demonstrated that the practice of many creditors to wholesale rather then retail their repossessions is consistent with the view that creditors maximize. Indeed, requiring retail sales, as some have proposed, actually would cause debtors to pay higher deficiencies than they now do. Finally, Section IIC showed that creditors could do better by failing to maximize resale value if they could successfully cartelize resale markets. Section IIC went on to argue that no persuasive evidence of the existence of creditor cartels exists, and that theory suggests that their existence is improbable. In consequence of this analysis, public policy should no longer be made on the assumption that creditors do not maximize; the assumption must be the other way.
III. REPOSSESSION AND THE ALLEGED DESTRUCTION OF VALUE
Coercive repossession is said to impose greater harms on debtors than it creates gains for creditors. This might occur in four ways. First, debtors may value goods in their possession in excess of the goods' market price. 49 The difficulties discussed above respecting dealer trading cartels seemingly could be avoided by secret side payments. For example, if the dealer in the first illustration in Sec. IIA sold the $3,000 car for $1,500 and sued for a $3,500 deficiency, but later received a secret $500 side payment from the second dealer, he would do $71.51 better than if he sold the car for $3,000. No cartel would be necessary; rather the market would have repossessing dealers offering cars for less than their actual value to whoever would make the highest side payments. But if this were so, the side payments would actually run the other way; the first dealer would sell the car for $3,000, its actual price, less the sum the second dealer would demand to cooperate in creating a bill of sale that said "$1,500." Apparently no one believes that such blatant lying about the prices at which collateral is resold is common. This may be because lying would be relatively easy to detect if the repossessing creditor reported the difference between the $3,000 actually received and the $1,500 claimed to be received in the deficiency action to its shareholders and on its tax returns. On the other hand, the failure to report this income is grounds for criminal sanctions.
For example, a consumer would sell his stereo for no less than its used goods price is $500. When the stereo is repossessed and $500, $100 of value allegedly is destroyed. Second, the lack of resale markets may unduly depress the value of used goods. Su the debtor's stereo would be worth at least $500 to anyone who reliable it was, such as the debtor himself, but strangers would fea downs and thus would pay no more than $400 for the stereo. T price for used stereos is artificially depressed because owners k about their goods than outsiders do. In this illustration, the in asymmetry causes a $100 value loss because the repossessin could sell the stereo for at most $400. Third, repossession cou human capital. As an example, the stereo may work perfectly i certain fashion that the debtor has discovered. When the stere sessed and resold, the new owner must take time to learn-if h learn-how best to use it. In consequence, the debtor's inves learning how to use his stereo is wasted. Fourth, repossession pose psychic losses on debtors that are not offset by psychic gains elsewhere.
These harms could not occur if debtors were perfectly inform consequences of granting security. If security imposed greate harms on debtors than it created expected gains for creditors, could not purchase the consent of debtors to grant it; rather would forgo granting security in favor of paying higher intere was noted in the Introduction, this paper assumes instead that when they borrow are ignorant of the possibility that reposse impose on them losses such as those just described. If debt uninformed and if these losses do occur, repossession would be able because it minimizes welfare. Section III next argues, dep the way in which repossession is alleged to impose harm, that losses occur from it, that no net losses can be shown to occur, o net losses are trivial.
The first form of the value destruction claim, that a debtor loses the difference between the value he attaches to the goods and their market price, seemingly assumes what is to be decided. To see why, let P = the collaterals' used goods market price and W be the price that the debtor would charge to sell the collateral voluntarily. In the illustration that introduced Section III, P = $500 and W = $600; thus repossession imposed a $100 loss on the debtor. However, one can "lose" only what one "owns." Suppose that the state had previously decided to confer on secured creditors the absolute right to repossess whenever a debtor defaulted. Then the debtor seemingly would lose nothing from repossession because after default he would own nothing. This version of the value destruction claim can be stated in a nonconclusory way if a debtor who lacked the right to keep the collateral in the event of default would bid in excess of its market price to prevent repossession. Let V = the price a debtor would pay to keep the goods if he had no legal right to them. Then if V > P, the debtor incurs a value loss even though he lacks the property right. Proponents of the value destruction claim seemingly suppose the losses that debtors incur from repossession to be nontrivial; in the terminology used here, they suppose W -P to be large. If they are right, V also is likely to exceed P. This is because the price which the debtor would bid for the right to keep the goods (V) is unlikely to be very much lower than the price the debtor would choose to sell the right (W), so that if the latter is considerably greater than the market price (P), the former will exceed the market price also.5o In this event, the value destruction claim can be made out independently of where the property right is. The debtor's loss is W -P if he owns the right and V -P if he does not, with both magnitudes exceeding zero. It is a separate question whether in fact both magnitudes are positive, but for now this is assumed.
A complete statement of the initial version of the value destruction claim must also explain why a debtor who values goods in excess of their market price would ever default. To understand this problem, let D be the 50 W and V will differ in part because of income effects. If the right to keep particular goods on default is a normal good, a debtor would spend the same proportion of his income on this right regardless of how much he makes. Because a debtor without the right is poorer-by the value of the right-than is a debtor with the right, a debtor without it would spend less of his income in dollars to purchase it than he would charge in dollars to give it up.
The text assumes the right to keep the collateral on default to be a normal good, and so suppose W, the ask price, to be greater than V, the bid price, but not very much greater. Economists usually assume that income effects of this sort are small because owning a legal right is unlikely to add very much to a person's wealth, nor will losing one make a person considerably poorer. In consequence, the prices one will pay to keep or to buy a right should seldom differ significantly. See Robert D. Willig, Consumer's Surplus without Apology, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 589 (1976) . Recent evidence, however, suggests that differences between bid and ask prices, at least in laboratory settings, commonly are too large to be accounted for by income effects alone. See Jack Knetch & Charles Sinden, Willingness.to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, Q. J. Econ., in press (1982) . If this evidence generalizes to real cases, the assignment of legal rights could determine outcomes more frequently than is commonly supposed. For example, repossession could destroy value if the debtor is assumed to own the right, W > P, but may not destroy value if the creditor has the right, V < P. If this outcome seems possible, the assignment of rights must be independently justified. Section V, infra, does consider noninstrumentalist justifications for assigning the right to the debtor. outstanding debt, which is the unpaid portion of the price, w being defined as above. Suppose the debtor's circumstances have changed after a sale such that he comes to believe that the goods are worth less to him than the unpaid price; for example, the debtor has become unemployed and would rather spend scarce resources on rent than on stereo payments. In this event, the debtor has an incentive to abandon the deal because the goods are worth less to him than the outstanding debt ( It thus is difficult to explain default when debtors value the collateral at more than its market price. A debtor might believe that his creditor will repossess but not sue because deficiencies are sought in a minority of cases; if the debtor is correct, default gains him the difference between the outstanding debt and the value he attaches to the goods. Also, default enables the debtor to reallocate his resources to meet immediate needs.
The benefit of being able to do this may sometimes exceed the net loss that repossession plus a deficiency action impose.51 It is now possible to state the initial version of the value destruction claim completely: If (1) debtors would ask a sum in excess of the collateral's used goods market price to allow a creditor to repossess on default, W -P > 0; or (2) debtors would bid a sum in excess of the used goods market price to retain the collateral in this event, V -P > 0; and (3) debtors routinely default when the utility they would derive from retain ing the unpaid portion of the price exceeds the utility they would derive from retaining the goods, D > W or V, then repossession causes debtors to lose value. Further, if (4) creditors necessarily derive less value from repossessed goods than debtors lose an wise create value, repossession also cau The latter two assumptions seem less l Respecting 'assumption 4, consider the as a seller of used goods. Firms commonly are assumed to sell until marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Most units that are sold, however, are inframarginal; they bring in revenue in excess of cost. Suppose then that (a) the market price of a used item is $500; (b) the defaulting debtor would pay $590 for the right to retain the item; (c) the product when repossessed and resold is inframarginal to the creditor, bringing in revenue of $120 over costs; and (d) the debtor and creditor have the same marginal utility for money. In this circumstance, repossession actually creates a net social gain; the creditor gains $30 of utility more than the debtor loses. In actual cases, it would be impossible to know whether repossession creates net social gains of this sort. This is because the parties probably will have different marginal utilities for money, but these utilities as well as the debtors' bid and ask prices are unobservable. The point of the illustration rather is to show that the creditor's net gain from repossession and resale is not necessarily less than the debtor's loss.
Assumption 5 above also is unlikely to hold because second buyers commonly value resold goods in excess of their price. This point is made clearly with a graph (Figure 1 ). The curves S (supply) and D (demand) are for used goods when the debtor decides that the goods are worth less to him than the unpaid portion of the price. The debtor in this illustration is located at point A on the supply curve S; this means, supposing him to have the property right, that he would not sell the collate goods market price, P*, but would sell if the price rose to ence between these two prices, P' -P*, is the debtor's loss session, in the sense at issue here. The second buyer is loca on the demand curve D; this means that he would buy the price were as high as P'. The difference between this price a price at which he is able to purchase, P1 -P*, is the second In this illustration, these gains and losses exactly offset on they need not; considering just the debtor and second buye and resale could create net social gains or losses, depending tions the parties attach to the goods. Unfortunately, these unobservable, but the point is the same; repossession does ily destroy value. To summarize, if the debtor's loss from repossession is as the difference between the price for which the debtor woul the right to keep the collateral and the collateral's market sion would create net social losses only if the debtor's exceeds the creditor's and second buyer's gain. Decision m know whether this is the case. From a utilitarian perspec the analysis does show the fallacy of a claim that repossess creates net social losses because debtors always lose val speculation is fair, repossession may create net social gain cause debtors seem more likely to default when they care about retaining possession. The smaller the debtor's loss, th it is to be outweighed by the gains repossession creates f and second buyer. The second version of the value destruction claim asserts sion creates greater harms than gains in consequence of t extensive depreciation to which consumer goods often are depreciation allegedly is a function of the absence of e markets for used consumer goods. It is said to destroy repossessed goods are "worth" more than the unduly lo command.52 Two factors apparently contribute most to the depreciation of consumer goods, neither of which supports the conclusion that repossession destroys value. First, new goods command a premium partly because of their newness; consumers want the experience of the first few drives in a new car or the first views of a new television. Because each such experience can be had only once, when they are important new goods will sell for much more than used goods. Althoug command may sometimes be large because of the "newness" factor, repossession cannot destroy value in this sense. The debtor, being the first buyer, by then has consumed the relevant good; he has exhausted the product's newness. Thus he loses nothing when the product is taken and resold at a discount that reflects its used goods character.
A second factor that may contribute to the allegedly excessive depreciation of consumer goods collateral is a function of the greater probability that these goods will fail and of the inability of buyers to observe this probability. To understand the possible effect of the resultant information asymmetry, suppose that cars are of two kinds, good ones and bad ones, but that consumers cannot tell the difference before they purchase. After use, a consumer knows which kind of car he has. An information asymmetry has then developed, since car owners know more than (used) car buyers about vehicle quality. In this circumstance, price within a model class will reflect consumer views of average car quality. If consumers supposed average quality to be higher than it is, the market would be swamped with bad cars, offered for sale at the "good car price." Consumers probably are aware of this possibility, however, and when they lack information about actual quality will suppose average quality to be relatively low. A person owning a car whose quality is above this perceived average is therefore locked in. His car is worth more than the market price, yet that price is all he can get for it. More to the point, when this debtor's car is repossessed, it will be resold at the market price. If the debtor had a good car, and more cars are likely to be above the perceived average than below it, repossession would inflict harm on the debtor in excess of the price the car can command in the market.53 Also, this harm occurs independent of which party is assumed to have a right to the goods in the event of default. If the debtor has the right, he suffers harm in the fashion just described. If the creditor has the right, the information asymmetry prevents the creditor from selling the goods at their "true" value; in consequence, the deficiency that the debtor will have to pay is increased.
Although debtors sometimes may lose value in the sense at issue here when goods are repossessed, for three reasons the conclusion that repossession creates net social harms does not follow. First, the quality o some used goods, such as furniture, seems observable before purchase.
As to this collateral, the information asymmetry on which rests does not exist. Second, when a good repossessed car sale, the percentage of good cars in the market has incre potential car buyers do not know this. A buyer of this r thus gets a windfall, an above average car at the "average gain must be set against the loss that the debtor suffered the parties' preferences, repossession again could create n or losses. For example, if the debtor used the car occasion ational use but the second buyer was a traveling salesman buyer probably would gain more from owning an above av the debtor would lose by being without one. Third, mark often will correct for the information asymmetry, so th repossessed items will reflect their actual value. Such inst guarantees and the concern of sellers for their reputations of their possible effectiveness, a recent study of the ma pickup trucks supposed that if the information asymmetr did in fact exist, owners of high maintenance trucks wou selling them in the used market; hence, this partial consu percent of pickups are used for personal transportatio "market for lemons." The study reported, however, "tha were purchased used required no more maintenance than t age that had not been traded."54 Institutions such as guar often prevent debtors from losing value in the sense at is 54 See Eric Bond, A Direct Test of the "Lemons" Model: The Market Trucks, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 836 (1982) . This information problem could than is commonly thought if debtors are more likely to default when the also Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets 27 (1982) . Commentators sometimes attribute the value loss debtors ma absence of well-developed markets for used goods (see authorities cited the alleged absence of such markets is not explained. A market for private arise for supply side reasons, such as barriers to entry, or demand sid consumers' unwillingness to pay enough to have the product be prod obstacles to the formation of used goods markets seem slight, for entry in relatively cheap. The text discusses two demand side obstacles, that cons purchase "newness" and that information asymmetries may make cons purchase. Neither obstacle seems serious enough to support the value d Also, the assumption that viable resale markets for used goods do not drawn. Two investigators sampled 203 households in the Cedar Rapid what percentage of consumer durables in each home were used. See Leonard Konopa, Ownership Levels, Acquisition and Disposition Cha Consumer Durable Used-Goods, 8 Akron Bus. & Econ. Rev. 30 (1977) . They found that 18.49 percent of the durable goods owned by the sample were used. Some 55.6 percent of these were purchased, the remainder being gifts. Also, 15.6 percent of the used goods were purchased from "Business Firms or other Institutions"; that is, approximately 3 percent of the durables owned by the sample were bought used from institutions. Considering the very large number of consumer durables that Americans own, these figures suggest that used goods markets for such frequently repossessed items as major appliances, boats, dressers, The third way in which repossession i the destruction of human capital that this could occur, suppose the debtor o treated in a certain way but will not star wise. The car is then repossessed and resold but the second buyer is ignorant of its character. The investment the debtor made in learning how to use the car is thus destroyed, with no offsetting gain.5 Value is lost when human capital is destroyed in this way, but the losses seem occasional and slight for three reasons. First, human capital will not exist respecting many consumer goods. There is no trick to making a couch work. Second, people seldom need tricks to make new goods work. This is partly because they often do work. When they do not-a new car does not start in cold weather-the goods commonly are fixed under warranty or a disadvantaged buyer has the right to revoke his acceptance. Because repossessed goods often are nearly new-default can occur only during the payment period-debtors seldom will have invested human capital in learning how to use them.56 Third, most consumers lack technical skills. In consequence, the methods they develop to make used goods work commonly are easy to discover. Thus the second buyer in the illustration above should quickly learn how to start the car. These three reasons taken together show that the destruction of human capital inherent in repossession is too trivial to support extensive restrictions on security interests in consumer goods.
In summary, if the harm that repossession imposes on debtors is conceptualized in "economic" terms-debtors lose human capital or the difference between the goods' value to them and its price-repossession imposes trivial harms, no harms at all, or harms that cannot be shown to exceed the gains, depending on how one considers the harm to have been inflicted. Under none of these outcomes is the welfare-minimizing objection to repossession persuasive. If "psychic" rather than "economic" costs are considered, debtors could suffer losses from repossession not offset by gains elsewhere, at tables, and musical instruments do exist. The authors concluded: "Such suppositions as: (a) the ownership of durable used-goods is essentially a characteristic of the economically deprived in our society; and (b) householders typically eschew used-durables because they do not want 'other people's castoff second-hand durables or troubles,' are not supported by the data" (id. at 33-34). least in theory. Suppose that debtors are humiliated when close on liened property. Then if (1) creditors derive no repossessing other than the pleasure of reducing the deb repossessed goods derive no pleasure from knowing (if the the goods were repossessed; and (3) debtors would regard t of a portion of their wages from each paycheck-garnish humiliating than repossession, coercive property execution chic harms not offset by gains elsewhere.57
This line of attack against repossession is unconvincing understanding of the phenomenon. Initially, whether rep net psychic losses is uncertain. Assumption 1 above is pr assumption 3 is more so, for while the debtor's family an would know whether garnishment or repossession has occ ments seem at least as public as repossessions, since garn come known to the debtor's employer and co-workers. Fu repossesion entails costs. Under current law, creditors hav repossession or garnishment. That many creditors choose method suggests that it sometimes has advantages over th ning repossession thus will create costs that must be set psychic losses that repossession may cause. Precisely com sets of costs seems impossible so a utilitarian case against unpersuasive even when psychic costs are considered.
absence of a coherent claim that repossessions impose gr harms on persons than garnishments, a fairness case aga sion, on the ground that it inevitably is disrespectful to compelling.
IV. IN TERROREM REPOSSESSIONS
The disapproval of security in consumer contexts rests partly on the belief that creditors do not take security to raise revenue in the usual sense-through foreclosure and resale. Instead, creditors use the threat 58 Income execution-that is, garnishment-has higher procedural costs than private repossessions because courts are involved. Also, income execution is a time-consuming collection method, especially for large claims, because the law prevents creditors from taking more than 25 percent of the debtor's take-home pay per paycheck. Consumer Credit Protection Act ? 303(a) (1968) . This delay imposes two sorts of costs: (1) if creditors earn more with money than the legal rate of interest, delay creates opportunity cost losses; (2) delay also increases the likelihood that debtors will go bankrupt and thus erase part (or all) of the debt. In addition, although it is unlawful for an employer to dismiss an employee whose wages have been garnished only once, employers are commonly believed often to dismiss or otherwise sanction garnished employees. This is a cost peculiar to income execution.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Tue, 03 Oct 2017 21:49:36 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms of foreclosure to coerce payment.59 Th primarily as an in terrorem device is li cussed above: because creditors are indifferent to the returns that foreclosure brings (the failure to maximize claim) and because repossessed goods are worth little (version 2 of the destruction-of-value claim) creditors must take security only for its threat value. That creditors commonly so act should now seem less plausible, but the issue here is whether in terrorem repossessions are blameworthy, however often done. In this Section I argue that some of the concerns that seemingly animate the distaste for in terrorem repossessions are misplaced and others are unpersuasive.
Before reaching the analysis, it is helpful to define an in terrorem repossession. Suppose that creditors repossess only when the gains to them from doing so exceed the costs. Let these gains be direct and indirect: direct gains derive from resale revenues; indirect gains derive from the expected improvement in the creditor's collection experience because each actual repossession makes more credible the creditor's constant threat to impose costs on nonpayers. An in terrorem repossession then occurs when repossession costs exceed the direct gains but are less than the sum of direct and indirect gains. This definition captures the allegedly objectionable feature of in terrorem repossessions-that they would not be made except for their value in establishing credible threats. The definition also rests on the premise that repossessions cannot be objectionable, in the sense at issue here, when their direct gains exceed their direct costs, even though they may produce indirect gains. This is because the debtor's agreement to give security implies his consent to the use of security for its plainly legitimate purpose-to reduce the outstanding debt. In terrorem repossessions may be thought improper for ex ante reasons (it is wrong for creditors to coerce payment by threatening foreclosure) or for ex post reasons (it is wrong for creditors to make examples of debtors who differ in no relevant respects from those whose goods are untouched). Regulating security is an inappropriate response to the first set of concerns. The alleged evil of threats to take the collateral at once is that the threats may cause debtors to forgo defenses to the underlying claim. These defenses are of two kinds: reasons not to pay that are sufficient 59 A typical statement of this view asserts that nonpurchase money security interests "equip a creditor with a capacity to threaten the consumer with extreme deprivation to induce the consumer to acquiesce to the creditor's demands whether or not the demands are reasonable." Credit Practices, supra note 28, at 193-94. See also id. at 210-11; J. Spanogle and R. Rohner, Consumer Law Cases and Materials 328 (1979); Whitford, supra note 10; H. R. Rep. No. 595, 95 Cong. 1st Sess. 126-27 (1977) All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms under current law, such as a creditor's breach of warranty, not to pay that "in good conscience" should prevail, such as illness. The response that is called for by the former concern creditors to justify their claims to an impartial third party a debtors to assert defenses before the goods can be repossess best done by means of a preliminary hearing, such as may be con ally required when creditors attach property under the autho statutes rather than private contracts.60 In light of the very sm age of debtors who could raise tenable legal defenses to a claim sure, prohibiting foreclosure altogether or making it mater difficult are responses that seem disproportionate to the alle Critics of security also are concerned with "moral" defens payment. The literature supporting regulation often contains debtors fail to pay largely because of circumstances beyond t such as illness or unemployment.61 The premise underlying t apparently is that it is too harsh to make debtors who have s misfortune choose between payment or repossession. Regula sessions is an inappropriate response to this concern because 60 The constitutional requirements are described in Mitchell v. W. T. Gran 600 (1974) . A hearing is not constitutionally required when the creditor reposs to a Code security interest. For example, Adams v. Southern California Fir Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1006 (1974) . See al Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 199 (1978) . The Model Consumer Credit Act (1973), National Consumer Law Center, requires repossession to be by legal action, state has adopted this statute. Wisconsin has come close, requiring reposse action unless "the customer has surrendered the collateral." Wisconsin Consumer Act ? 425.206(1)(b) (1973) . A surrender "is not . . . voluntary" if it is "made pursuant to" creditor's "request or demand" or "pursuant to a threat, statement or notice by the .
[creditor] that [he] . . . intends to take possession of the collateral." Id. at ? 425.204(3 text does not advocate hearings prior to repossession; instead, it claims that if thre repossess in fact cause many consumers to forgo legal defenses, the appropriate remedy hearing, not the regulation of security. A major debate took place in the 1970s-over whe a hearing should be constitutionally required when creditors attached goods pursuan state statute. Opponents of the requirement argued that debtors seldom had good def and that hearings would be excessively costly; proponents disputed both assertion All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms actually goes to the circumstances under cused. It is best to focus directly on the obliquely by restricting security. To see unemployment is a proper excusing circu on the taking of security permit a secure eschews a suit on the debt or to sue but creditor thus can collect at least some of regulated. If unemployment should excu itor should receive nothing. Suppose inst excuse default. Then restrictions on secu often cause creditors to be paid less than legitimate excuse for defaulting. It is, in excuse issue by regulating security, beca insures only that debtors will have to pa The second set of objections to in terro their property of making examples of par two aspects. The first is an expectations goods are taken could not reasonably thi suffer. The second is an equality claim: m reason exists to punish this debtor. Neith ing expectations, the signing of a securi debtor that the goods may be taken if he incentives to overstate the frequency w probably they often do so. In these circ and likely does know that repossession i unfair surprise will seldom be tenable.
The equality claim is not compelling because good reasons exist to make in terrorem repossessions, supposing them to occur. They may encourage repayment at least cost to debtors as a group because creditors have incentives to use cost-minimizing collection methods. If one such method is banned a more costly one will be used, and debtors will bear part of the resultant cost increase. If the threat of repossession is the least-cost method and is to be effective, some repossessions must be made. The question then becomes whether the equality goal-all debtors are relevantly alike and thus all or none should be foreclosed againstshould take precedence over the group welfare and desert goalsconsumers generally benefit from selective foreclosure and this debtor deserves to be foreclosed against because he did not pay. In the criminal law, the equality goal-all persons who commit crimes shoul larly prosecuted and punished-is subordinated to the group desert goals; no one has a right to avoid conviction because a similar perpetrator was not prosecuted. This principle becomes controversial in only two circumstances: when the state proceeds against persons partly with the goal of using their punishment to deter others but punishes them in a drastic and irreversible fashion such as by execution;63 or when resource constraints enable the state to proceed against only a subset of suspected criminals and the subset is selected by disfavored criteria such as race. A defaulting debtor whose goods are taken for deterrence reasons has prima facie no better claim of excuse than the burglar who is fairly caught. Most burglars are not caught, but this burglar actually committed the crime, and burglary is a bad action that may be reduced by conviction. By the same reasoning, the debtor failed to pay, and unjustified nonpayment is a bad action that may be reduced by foreclosure. In addition, relevant differences often may exist between debtors whose goods are taken and those who escape. Creditors have incentives to preserve good will while collecting debts. These incentives should lead them to make in terrorem repossessions only against obvious deadbeats, and creditors claim to proceed, in the contexts in which in terrorem repossessions are said to occur, primarily against persons who do not pay without even the moral excuses discussed above.
V. PROPERTY RIGHTS OBJECTIONS TO SECURITY
The justifications for regulating security discussed above, in particular the claims that repossession destroys value or is done for in terrorem motives, seem animated by a set of inchoate moral concerns. Allowing creditors to take unrestricted security interests in consumer goods is felt unjustifiably to deprive persons of property, but those who believe this have yet to show how their belief follows from current normative conceptions of the sources of property rights. In consequence of the belief and this failure, critics of security often cast moral objections to it in the more familiar language of economics. These objections should be evaluated directly. Section V attempts to explicate theories of property rights from which objections to unregulated security could tenably be derived; it then argues that these objections cannot support present regulation.64 63 See Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1143 (1980 . 64 The literature supporting the reforms discussed here seldom explicitly justifies them on distributional grounds, but a distributional theme may underlie the case for regulation. If so, for two related reasons the theme is inappropriate. The supply of consumer credit probably Two preliminary matters should be clarified sis. First, the argument assumes: (1) peopl security interest means to authorize the cred collateral in the event of nonpayment; (2) co set forth in readily understandable language made in such fashion as to be easily acted on markets are competitive. These assumptions are true, but to focus attention on the question objectionable in relatively ideal circumstanc problems generated by the failure of any of th actual markets has familiar justifications that c law doctrines.
Second, recent legislation in this area has been influenced by a belief that consumers in unregulated markets put their property too much at risk. This belief is partly responsible for two kinds of regulation: restrictions on the granting of security belong to the class that directly limits risk taking; relaxed requirements for becoming a bankrupt and expanded bankruptcy exemptions,65 in contrast, ameliorate the consequences of risk taking. An ideal treatment of any particular aspect of this legislation would consider both types of responses to risk taking because they may be related. For example, decision makers could want to relax restrictions on risk taking initially because, through bankruptcy legislation, they have minimized the consequences that risk taking creates. This paper nevertheless only discusses an aspect of risk-limiting regulation. This is because the subject of risk taking in consumer transactions seems too broad and complex to be treated as a whole, given present levels of understanding; rather, the best chance of understanding it lies in making detailed analyses of various of its parts.
is elastic in relation to the demand; that is, credit suppliers apparently can sell money in nonconsumer markets more conveniently than consumers, especially low-income consumers, can forgo debt. This being so, much of the cost of regulation will be passed on to debtors in the form of higher prices, reduced credit availability, or less favored purchase terms.
There are two reasons why this outcome is unsatisfactory. First, because much of the cost is passed on, the resultant redistribution is less from creditors to debtors than among the debtors themselves. The defaulters gain at the expense of those who pay higher interest rates or are denied credit. To the extent that default is within the control of debtorspersons can borrow wisely or otherwise manage their affairs appropriately-requiring " nocent" consumers to subsidize defaulters seems difficult to justify. Second, credit marke are believed to segment; the middle class and rich commonly buy and borrow from differ firms from the poor. Thus wealth is unlikely to be redistributed across class lines, but rat within social classes. See Whitford, supra note 10. Poor consumers who pay higher inte rates or are denied credit subsidize poor consumers who default. This outcome seemin taxes the wrong group. Two related theories of property rights, both of which derive from the effect on personal autonomy of the possession of things, seem germane. The first is a welfare rights theory which holds that each person needs an irreducible minimum of physical things in order to lead a full and autonomous life. Such a life cannot be led by one destitute of possessions. If the state were to sanction the taking of everything a person owns, it would therefore be permitting the destruction of his ability to be a full member of society. To treat persons in this way poses a threat to the community's viability and also is impermissibly disrespectful to them. In consequence, the state should ensure that people will always retain the requisite minimum of possessions.66 The second theory focuses more directly on the relation of people to physical objects, holding that people partly constitute themselves through their possession of tangible things; people, in effect, are at least partly what they own. Much property that people own obviously is "fungible"-a toaster or a tire iron-but some property is "personal" in the sense that the possessor's personality is bound up with owning it-a wedding ring or a home. The same property may be fungible to one owner and personal to another because people invest themselves in different kinds of things, but the relevant point is that some property is personal in a wholesome rather than a fetishistic sense. If the state were to allow the taking of anything a person may own, it must necessarily allow the taking of personal property; this could result in the destruction of important aspects of people's personalities. Because people have a right to be whole, they have a right to own those things in which their wholeness partly resides.67
Both of these theories accord people rights to things that are good against (at least some forms of) involuntary divestment. The issue in this context, however, is alienability: can a frigerator or his father's watch as secur question, it is helpful to distinguish betw and purchase-money security interests lenders to secure the purchase price. P are common in connection with instal would be contradictory of the propert prohibit them. If people prefer to give rather than pay higher interest rates money security less attractive to cred purchases or will increase their difficu welfare rights theory, it is contradicto of assembling the irreducible minimum full and autonomous life in the name Respecting the second theory, it is contra a person has in buying goods that will name of protecting his interest in goods t both relevant property theories prote these theories seemingly should perm gage-goods when alienation will mater ownership. Moral objections to the givin the unrelatedness of security to acquis 68 Modern property theory recognizes three sour One source derives from the Lockean notion t mixing his labor with them; a second derives from be assigned in such fashion as to maximize utilit immediate sense, from concern for individual per ways as to preserve or create their ability to be fu source of property rights because the relevant leg Lockean theory seemingly assumes a virtually u has acquired rights in a thing, by mixing one's lab supports restricting the person's power to exch Locke seemingly justifies property rights partl money has been invented; in a world with mon justifiable partly because it increases social utili Property, 30 Pol. Stud. 28 (1982) . Utilitarianism especially if the modern view that people can b own utility is accepted. For then voluntary exc that they are made only when they maximize the Lockean and utilitarian theories, an unrestrained the property right itself when that right derives is because persons, at least in theory, could alie autonomous lives or necessary to their personhoo property provide to restraints on alienation may p contract in consumer contexts sometimes have a w to show that even personality theories cannot su security.
money security interests but perhaps should not be allowed t what is already theirs.
The conclusion that broad security interests in consumer go be restricted does not follow from the notion of unrelatedness alone. To see why, recall that people now are free to sell their possessions: a person can convert the irreducible minimum of goods to cash or sell "the old home place."'69 This freedom is only partly justified by administrative convenience, for institutions such as conservatorships exist or could be fashioned to prevent people from selling all their goods. Rather, the freedom to sell is also justified by notions of personal autonomy. Should these notions permit sales but prevent mortgages? Answers seemingly must derive from the uncertainties that attend the mortgage decision. One such answer may run like this: a person deciding whether to make a present sale of his property can know what affect on his life being without the goods at issue will have. More accurately, because the effects of a sale are felt immediately, a person can predict his reaction to these effects as well as he can predict his reaction to any action he will take. The decision to mortgage, in contrast, requires a person to predict the affect on his life of the later forcible removal of many of his possessions or a significant few. The effects of repossession, however, may be incommensurable in the sense that one must experience it to know it. In consequence, people cannot asssess adequately the threat to their autonomy posed by mortgages. If people underestimate this threat, an unregulated right to mortgage will permit them heedlessly to imperil their autonomy by putting their possessions too much at risk.
This justification for limiting the ability to mortgage rests on a factual question is factual but the facts are very hard to get, it is often sensible to resolve the matter by considering the consequences of assigning to one or the other position the burden of persuasion. Section V next makes three arguments in support of the view that people should be allowed to mort-gage whatever they are allowed to sell, a the mortgage decision are developed. Th theme, which is that the restrictions on flow from constricting people's ability to the autonomy-enhancing effects of a lim Because these latter effects are obscure rights objections to limiting security th
The first argument is that the uncertainti mortgage are not unique. Our society al sions that affect their futures in an imp what to work, whom to marry, whether soldiers, and where to live. People seem e the potentially adverse consequences to them of borrowing on the strength of a used car. Nor do these consequences appear graver than those people face in other areas where autonomy is given scope. Until new facts shatter the commonsense intuition that the mortgage decision is relevantly similar to decisions that people can now freely make, people should be allowed to mortgage. The second argument is concerned more directly with the potentially contradictory effects on autonomy that flow from restrictions on the ability to transact. These restrictions could increase autonomy, in the sense of enabling people to keep a necessary minimum of goods or a particularly important few, but the restrictions also decrease autonomy by diminishing the set of transactions people can make. It is argued below that limiting the ability to give security decreases the autonomy of poor persons, in this latter sense, more than that of middle-class persons. The autonomy-enhancing effect of this regulation, however, is difficult to assess. When the autonomy-increasing effect of regulation is unclear but its autonomy-decreasing effect seems both clear and especially burdensome to a group commonly thought most in need of help, the regulation is unwarranted.
Respecting the effect that limiting security has on poor persons, regulation of the sort described above creates incentives for creditors to lend to better risks, raise interest rates, or shift to other forms of security such as second mortgages on homes.70 This change in the mix of credit offerings constricts the ability of poor people to borrow more than it constricts the middle class. Poor people are relatively bad credit risks, are less able to pay high interest rates, and seldom can offer second mortgages. To show 70 The FTC staff said of its proposed rule banning security interests in household goods that it was "not [meant] to prevent consumers from borrowing on the equity in their homes, stocks and bonds." Credit Practices, supra note 28, at 244. that regulation of this sort has a differential effect on th omy, however, it is not enough to show that the law im constraints on them. If freedom of contract poses a greate poor's autonomy than to the autonomy of others, correspo restrictions on the poor's ability to contract are necessary Two ways to show that security poses a peculiar threat exist, but neither seems persuasive. The first is to argue th less able than others to make intelligent choices between r ment or foreclosure; as a result, they will risk foreclosure The few studies of the poor's ability to conduct commerc fail to support the conclusion that they are less competent make decisions of this sort.71 The second way to show tha a greater threat to the poor's autonomy is to establish th economic choices have graver consequences for them. In such an argument seems straightforward: the poor ow through which to realize themselves than do the midd foreclosure poses a greater threat to their autonomy. For this succeed, however, a theory must exist relating the nature effect on autonomy. No such theory is now available.
To perceive the effect of this absence, suppose that person gives a second mortgage on his home to finance r penditures. The debtor knows that he will have difficulty debt when it is due but expects to refinance it on the strengt tion in his home's value. Instead, interest rates rise and h fall, in consequence of which the debtor defaults and los The debtor has lost not only money but also social status longer a homeowner; he cannot realize his life's plan in the expected. Also, he has lost a place with which his "per have been bound up. Do losses of this sort pose less gr personal autonomy than a poor person's loss of partic effects, such as a television? It is difficult to derive an a question from either of the property theories discussed ab relation between type of loss and autonomy is obscure, t greater restrictions on the poor's ability to contract are n unregulated contract poses a greater threat to the poor's au be sustained. Rather, what is left is the apparent fact th limiting security constrains the choices of poor people m strains the choices of middle-class people, even though n been made that the poor's autonomy is p decision. To justify a rule that makes th people, the autonomy-enhancing effects of The illustration above, however, seemingl be gained from restricting security, in t persons to lead fuller and freer lives, is
The third argument in support of treating threat to autonomy that foreclosure ma bankruptcy contexts if at all. This again i of the relevant property theories. The theo to retain an irreducible minimum of goods mous lives is of little help in specifying partly because the minimum varies as a that protects "personal property" is so f erty falls into this class apart from a f what is personal varies with people's pre taking of security thus will be both ove leave particular people with too few or wrong kind. The degree of misspecificat the relatively primitive nature of the t of the right thing often is preferable to do the something should be done. The choi cerns in the context of bankruptcies, lar pursue them prophylactically, by prohib that giving a general answer to this ques than can be attempted here. But when s fects-in the relevant moral sense-of r contracting, it seems more appropriate the relevant moral concerns in the bank disaster has actually occurred. At least th plainly rieed help. To summarize, moral objections to secu concern for personal autonomy; people should be allowed to retain a minimum of goods, or goods that have peculiar significance to them, in order to lead full and autonomous lives. The question these objections pose, however, is not whether people should have rights to things against involuntary seizure but whether whatever rights they do have are alienable. Persons should be allowed to give purchase money security interests because this form of security helps them to acquire the things in which their autonomy partly inheres. The case against security of other sorts must lie in the supposed inability of people to perceive fully the threat to their autonomy that mortgages pose; for society's moral intuitions seem The ability of parties to consumer credit transactions to contract fo security interests in consumer goods has been significantly limited in recent years, and further limitations are commonly proposed. Thr justifications for this regulation have been influential with decision ma ers: creditors systematically fail to maximize the proceeds from the sa of repossessed collateral, thereby increasing the size of the deficiency judgments that debtors must pay; repossession of consumer goods "de stroys value," in the sense that debtors lose the difference between t valuation they attach to the collateral and its used goods market price with no corresponding gain being conferred on anyone; and repossessio is not done to acquire the proceeds the collateral could bring but for terrorem purposes, to coerce repayment. The current opposition to per sonal property security also seems animated by moral concerns, in parti ular the belief that an untrammeled right to repossess will unduly erod the personal autonomy of debtors by depriving them of property nece sary for the leading of full and autonomous lives. This paper has shown that these justifications cannot support limiting the parties' ability to contract for security. Creditors have strong ince tives to maximize the value of repossessed goods, and the sparse available evidence indicates that they do so. Repossessions either do not de stroy value at all or merely transfer it, thereby vitiating objections to resting on the premise that it is wasteful. In terrorem repossessions occ less frequently than is commonly supposed; and they are not morally offensive when their purpose and effect are understood. And the property rights case against security, that its use threatens personal autonomy cannot sustain limitations on the ability of informed and competent con sumers to mortgage their property.
The argument made here, however, does not assert that personal prop erty security should be unregulated. When particular consumers are uni formed or incompetent, for example, traditional contract law reasons drawn from unconscionability theory support refusing to enforce unpleasant aspects of the contracts they make. Of greater importance, "marke for contract terms" sometimes may not reach competitive equilibria be cause of the expense to consumers of acquiring information about the The proof below generalizes the textual examples in Sec. IIA above t that it always pays a creditor to maximize the proceeds of resale. For nience, the proof assumes that the creditor's discount rate, r, is zero; this tion is relaxed at appropriate points. D = total unpaid debt; M = value of a maximizing resale; N = value of a nonmaximizing resale; b = discount rate for bankruptcy recovery ($0.12 on the dollar in t p = probability of debtor insolvency; c = marginal cost per dollar of debt collected by resale; c' = marginal cost per dollar of debt collected by deficiency actio Rm = creditor's recovery when he maximizes resale value; R, = creditor's recovery when he does not maximize resale value; D -M = debt remaining after a maximizing resale = A; D -N = debt remaining after a nonmaximizing resale = B. 74 These differences should not be overstated. For example, the most appropriate response to information problems is to require disclosure, but if the costs of disclosure are excessive, an outright ban of a particular practice is occasionally the best solution. These cases, however, are unlikely to correspond closely to the cases for regulation that have been developed from the four justifications rejected here, because information problems raise quite different issues. The statutes criticized here may also be thought of as provisions of a state-supplied insurance contract; debtors pay higher interest rates but are "insured" against an unpleasant consequence that would otherwise attend default, the consequence that is repossession. The question then is whether the insurance contract is optimal. This largely is a function of whether consumers are informed, an issue beyond the scope of this paper. In addition, if these statutes are regarded as an insurance policy, other questions arise. For example, do the statutes generate an unacceptable level of moral hazard, in the sense that they help cause an excessive number of defaults? If these statutes were repealed, The expression to the left of the inequality sign is Rm; the expression to the right is Rn. Thus it always is the case that Rm > Rn; creditors do better by maximizing resale proceeds. This result obtains independently of the costs of recovering a debt by resale as contrasted with the costs of recovery in a deficiency action.
To better understand what has been proved, focus once more on the expression X > (1 -p)(X -c' X) + p(b)(X -c' X). The left-hand side is the net difference between a value-maximizing and a nonmaximizing resale. This sum is greater than the right-hand side-the inequality is satisfied-when p = 0 or b = 1. What primarily drives the proof is the creditor's assumed inability to recover the costs of suit; if these costs vary directly with the amounts involved, which seems likely, the creditor has an incentive to sue for as little as possible. As a consequence, he has an incentive to sell the collateral for as much as possible-to maximize resale value. Creditors often use contract clauses that attempt to impose litigation costs on debtors. Supposing such a clause to exist, if p = 0 (the debtor with certainty can respond to a damage judgment), the inequality cannot be satisfied, for the right-hand term reduces to X; the creditor is indifferent to whether he maximizes or not. But it is plausible to assume that the creditor's discount rate is positive; the right-hand side then must be divided by a number greater than one, and so becomes less than X. Thus even when the debtor bears the costs of suit and can respond with certainty to any judgment against him, maximizing resale proceeds remains the profitable strategy. Finally, if p > 1 but b = 1-the creditor can collect 100 percent on the dollar including litigation costs in a bankruptcy proceeding-the inequality also cannot be satisfied; the right-hand side once more reduces to X. Again, however, if r > 0, it still pays to maximize. The significant point, though, is that 0 < p < 1 and 0 < b < 1 always; hence, maximizing resale proceeds is the profitable strategy regardless of whether litigation costs vary with the amounts involved, or of which party bears these costs, or of the creditor's discount rate.
